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In the light of the recent …nancial crisis, we investigate the e¤ects generated by
limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and …scal policy, where
monetary and …scal authority are independent and play strategically. We …nd that
limited asset market participation strongly a¤ects the optimal steady state and the
optimal dynamics of the di¤erent policy regimes considered. In particular: (i) both
in the long run and in short run equilibrium, a greater in‡ation bias is optimal than
in the standard representative agent economy; (ii) in response to a markup shock,
…scal policy becomes more active as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents
increases; (iii) optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardian, while
liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.
Keywords: liquidity constrained consumers, optimal monetary and …scal policy,
strategic interaction, in‡ation bias.
JEL codes: E3, E5.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the strategic interactions between monetary and …scal policy in an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model characterized by limited asset market partici-
pation (LAMP henceforth). We model LAMP as it is now standard in the literature (see
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1Galì et al. 2004, Bilbiie 2008 among others). We assume that a fraction of households
does not hold any asset, thus is liquidity constrained and in each period consumes all its
disposable labor income. The remaining households hold assets and smooth consump-
tion. This heterogeneity between households breaks the Ricardian Equivalence. For this
reason in the remainder of the paper we distinguish between non-Ricardian (or liquidity
constrained agents) and Ricardian consumers.
We focus our analysis on two policy games: i) the Nash game; ii) the Fiscal Leadership
game with conservative monetary policy. In both games the …scal and the monetary
authority cannot commit, they take their policy decisions independently period by period
and do not cooperate. We compare our results with those obtained in a standard Ricardian
agent economy (RAE henceforth), which was …rst considered by Adam and Billi (2008)
. In doing this, we …rst analyze the steady state properties of each policy game, then we
look at the dynamics of the model showing the optimal impulse response functions in face
of positive technology and negative price markup shocks.
We …nd that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters both the long-
run and short run properties characterizing the policy games of a RAE. Regarding the
steady state properties, we …nd that under Ramsey the optimal steady state implies price
stability no matter the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers. On the contrary,
when the two policy authorities do not cooperate and cannot commit an in‡ation bias
arises and it increases dramatically as the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers
increases. The Central Bank annualized in‡ation target approaches 9% even for a fraction
of non-Ricardian agents close to 30%. In the standard representative agent economy a
small in‡ation bias arises because the monetary authority disregards private expectations
on in‡ation. As a result, policy makers underestimate the welfare costs of generating
in‡ation today and are tempted to move output toward its e¢cient steady state level. In
our model we have an additional source of in‡ation bias coming from the increase in the
monopolistic distortion which occurs as the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers
gets higher. Indeed, as limited asset market participation increases, per capita pro…ts
earned by Ricardians get higher, monopolistic distortion increases and aggregate output
lowers. In‡ation acts as a tax on pro…ts. Thus, by in‡ating the economy the Central
Bank is able to reduce the monopolistic distortion. Consequently, the higher the fraction
of liquidity constrained consumer the higher is the need to in‡ate the economy.
Turning to the optimal dynamics, we show that LAMP plays an important role not
only under Nash and under the Fiscal leadership regime, but also under Ramsey. In
particular, we …nd the following. First, under Ramsey, the optimal responses to a markup
shock imply deviation from price stability and a positive public spending. However,
di¤erently from the RAE, in the presence of LAMP deviation from price stability is
achieved through a small reduction of the nominal interest rate, which leaves the real rate
almost unchanged. Second, under discretionary policies the optimal in‡ation volatility
is di¤erent from zero in response to both shocks. In particular, it more than doubles
in response to a technology shock for a fraction of non-Ricardian agents passing from
2zero to 50%. Moreover, in response to a markup shock the optimal …scal policy gets more
aggressive the higher the fraction of households who cannot access …nancial markets. This
last result holds for every policy regimes under analysis, suggesting the need of a more
active role for the …scal authority.
Finally, we …nd that the occurrence of the in‡ation bias has important implications
also for welfare. In fact, it leads to a great loss of welfare for Ricardians with respect to
Ramsey. At the same time, the higher real wage makes liquidity constrained consumers
consume more and, as a consequence, increase their welfare with respect to Ramsey.
Thus, contrary to what happens to Ricardian consumers, when the policy authorities
are independent and cannot commit liquidity constrained agents get a welfare gain with
respect to Ramsey.
In recent years, many authors concentrated on the issue of heterogeneity of consumers.
In particular, they considered the presence of a fraction of consumers which are liquid-
ity constrained, so that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold anymore. This feature
brought di¤erent results on the dynamics of the economic system with respect to the
standard framework. For example, Galì et al. 2007 demonstrate that the presence of
liquidity constrained consumers can explain consumption crowding in, which follows an
increase in government spending. Bilbiie (2008) shows that limited asset market par-
ticipation can lead to an inverted aggregate demand logic (the IS curve has a positive
slope). Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007) show that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy
increases as LAMP becomes more important. Galì et al (2004) study the determinacy
properties in a model with LAMP and capital accumulation under di¤erent Taylor rules.
These authors show that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers may alter the
determinacy properties of a standard NK model. To the best of our knowledge however,
the literature on LAMP does not analyze the strategic interaction between monetary and
…scal policy.
Most of the literature which studies …scal and monetary policy assumes that they are
both driven by a unique authority (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004a, 2004b, 2007 among
others). This is clearly not the case nowadays and in particular in the EU context, where
the creation of the currency area led to a structure with a unique monetary authority and
several independent …scal authorities. In such a context it is then relevant to investigate
the strategic interactions between the Central Bank and the …scal authorities, as done by
Gnocchi (2008), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Adam and Billi (2008) among others. Gnoc-
chi (2008) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005) focus on open economies and the role of …scal
policy stabilization. Gnocchi (2008) analyzes the e¤ects of …scal discretion in a currency
area, where a common and independent monetary authority commits to optimally set the
union-wide nominal interest rate. The main result is that discretion entails signi…cant
welfare costs so that it is not optimal to use …scal policy as a stabilization tool. Instead,
Beetsma and Jensen (2005) investigate the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded
New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, …nding that monetary policy
with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, …scal
3policy aims at stabilizing in‡ation di¤erences and the terms of trade. Finally, Adam and
Billi (2008) concentrate on a closed economy environment, studying monetary and …scal
policy games without commitment. They …nd that the lack of commitment gives rise to
excessive public spending and positive optimal in‡ation rate in steady state. Moreover, in
a context where the …scal policy is determined before monetary policy, a monetary policy
which only cares about in‡ation can eliminate these biases. Overall, all these papers do
not address the issue of LAMP. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge we are the …rst
to study di¤erent policy games in a model with LAMP.
The novelty of this study lies in the importance assigned to the presence of LAMP. In
fact, as we will show in the next section, liquidity constrained consumers have assumed
an increasingly relevant role in the economy, since after the recent …nancial crisis the
conditions of access to …nancial markets worsened. At the same time, both monetary and
…scal policies took prompt actions to prevent the economy from falling apart. Therefore,
the recent events fostered the theoretical studying of optimal monetary and …scal policy
mix in models characterized by limited asset market participation.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section shows some evidence on the decline
in households’ asset market participation following the recent …nancial crisis. Section 3
introduces the model, while section 4 presents the di¤erent policy regimes and analyzes
the optimal steady state and optimal dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
2 The recent tightening of credit standards
Since August 2007, starting date of the recent …nancial crisis, there has been a strong
increase in credit constraints. The trigger of the crisis was the housing bubble burst in the
US, which a¤ected deeply the …nancial market and the international banking system. The
direct consequences of these facts were liquidity shortage and stock markets downturns.
Many …nancial institutions collapsed around the world, contributing to the failure of key
businesses, declines in consumer wealth and a signi…cant decline in economic activity.
Questions regarding bank solvency have caused not only an interbank credit crunch but
also a decline in credit availability for both …rms and households. The main factors
contributing to the decline in credit availability were the bad expectations regarding
general economic activity and housing market prospects as well as cost of funds and
balance sheet constraints for banks.
In this section we show some empirical evidence on the decline of banking lending
to households, for housing and other consumer credit, in the Euro area and in the US1.
Figures 1 and 2 show the behavior of credit standards for the period 2003-2010.
1Data for the euro area are taken from The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey of the European Central
Bank. Data for the US are taken from the Senior Loan O¢cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
of the Federal Reserve Board.
4- Figures 1 and 2 about here -
As shown in Figure 1 credit standards tightened in the Euro area since the …rst months
of 2008. The tightening reached its maximum value in April 2009 and then started
decreasing. Nevertheless, in December 2009, the tightening was still higher than in the
pre-crisis period. The US credit standards feature a very similar behavior. However, as
shown in Figure 2 the tightening of credit standards started in the mid of 2007, before the
EU. Moreover, the tightening was even stronger than in the Euro area. These features
of the US credit standards are not surprising since the …nancial crisis was triggered by a
liquidity shortfall in the United States banking system at the beginning of the summer
2007, which afterwards spread all over the Euro area and most of the industrialized
countries.
Overall, the evidence on credit standards shows a sharp decline of credit to households
since the beginning of the crisis.
3 The model
3.1 Households
The model economy consists of a continuum of in…nitely-lived households. Households
are divided into a fraction 1   ￿ of ‘Ricardians’ who smooth consumption and have ac-
cess to assets markets; the remaining fraction ￿ are the so called ‘liquidity constrained’
consumers who have no assets and spend all their current disposable labor income for
consumption each period. Both types of households have the same preferences structure.










































t are Ricardian consumer’s consumption and hours worked, Cr
t;Nr
t are liquid-
ity constrained consumer’s consumption and hours worked and Gt is public expenditure.
Utility is separable in C, N, G and Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, Un < 0, Unn ￿ 0, Ug > 0, Ugg < 0.
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where Pt is the nominal price index, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Bt represents
the nominal value of the privately issued assets purchased by Ricardians in t and maturing
5in t+1, wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market, T o
t are lump sum taxes
and Dt are pro…ts of monopolistic …rms.









t ;Gt) subject to (3), taking as given fPt;wt;Rt;Gt;Tt;Dtg.2 From the



















Liquidity constrained consumers each period solve a static problem: they maximize
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As we will explain later in the paper, …rms are indi¤erent with respect to the type
of consumer to hire, therefore labor is homogenous and the two consumers get the same












 ￿ , (8)
which equals the ratio between the marginal utilities of Ricardian and liquidity constrained
consumers respectively.
The aggregate consumption and hours worked are de…ned as follows:
Ct = ￿C
r
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 ￿Bt+j=Pt+j = 0 hold.
63.2 Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i 2 [0;1] and a sector of …nal
















Yt, where ￿t represents the elasticity of substitution across varieties
and is assumed to be an AR(1) process log(￿t=￿) = ￿￿ log(￿t 1=￿) + s￿
t, with 0 < ￿￿ < 1
and s￿
t normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviation ￿￿. ￿t is
time-varying, thus induces ‡uctuations in the monopolistic markup charged by …rms. Pt









The intermediate good sector is characterized by …rms producing each a di¤erentiated
good with a technology represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function with a unique
factor of production (aggregate labor) and constant returns to scale:
Yt(i) = ZtNt(i) , (13)
where log(Zt=Z) = zt is an aggregate productivity shock with AR(1) process:
zt = ￿zzt 1 + s
z
t . (14)
0 < ￿z < 1 and sz
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation with zero
mean and standard deviation ￿z. In this context each …rm i has monopolistic power in
the production of its own good and therefore it sets the price. Prices are sticky à la










where ￿ is the degree of price rigidities.
The problem of the …rm is then to choose fPt(i);Nt(i)g1


























Yt = ZtNt(i) ,
(16)
where Yt = Ct + Gt and ￿t = Co
t
 ￿.
In equilibrium all …rms will charge the same price, so that we can assume symmetry.
After de…ning mct as the real marginal cost, the …rst order condition are:
wt = mctZt (17)
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(20)
3.3 Government
The government is composed by a monetary authority which sets the nominal interest
rate Rt and a …scal authority which determines the level of public expenditure Gt. The
government runs a balanced budget, so that in each period public consumption equals
lump sum taxes3.
PtGt = PtTt . (21)
De…ning aggregate lump sum taxes as Tt = ￿T r
t +(1 ￿)T o
t , if the same amount of lump
sum taxes is withdrawn from each individual (T r
t = T o
t ), we obtain Gt = Tt = T r
t = T o
t .
3As it will be clear, the presence of liquidity constrained agents allows to get signi…cant results even
in the absence of public debt. We leave the introduction of public debt to future research.
83.4 Equilibrium
To close the model we consider also the goods market clearing condition:
Zt[￿N
r
t + (1   ￿)N
o
t ] = ￿C
r
t + (1   ￿)C
o
t + Gt +
￿
2
(￿t   1)
2 . (22)





satisfying (5), (6), (8), (20) and (22), given the policies fGt;Tt;Rt ￿ 1g and the exogenous
processes ￿t;Zt.
4 Policy regimes
In this section we introduce the structure of the di¤erent policy games analyzed in
the paper. First, we will introduce the Ramsey problem, which allows for policy commit-
ment at time zero and full cooperation between monetary and …scal policy authorities.
Then, two di¤erent games structures will be presented: 1) the Nash game; 2) the Fiscal
Leadership game. In both cases, the two authorities cannot commit, take their decisions
separately and period by period. It follows that their behavior is suboptimal because they
fail to fully internalize the welfare cost of generating in‡ation.
Ramsey Policy. In this case the policy authorities fully cooperate and can commit,
which means that policy makers determine state-contingent future policies at time zero.
Di¤erently from the standard Social Planner problem, the Ramsey allocation takes into
account the distortions characterizing the model economy, i.e., sticky prices and monop-
olistic distortions. Therefore, Ramsey solution corresponds to a second best allocation




















s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) for all t .
(23)
where constraints (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) represent the equilibrium of the competitive
economy.
Nash Game. In this case, policy makers do not cooperate and cannot commit,
decide their policy simultaneously and period by period, by taking as given the current
policy choice of the other authority, all future policies and future private-sector choices.





























t+j;￿t+j;Rt+j 1 ￿ 1;Gt+jg given for j ￿ 1 .
(24)
The set of …rst order conditions de…ne the behavior of the …scal policy maker and
thus, its …scal reaction function (FRF henceforth). Analogously, the monetary authority





























t+j;￿t+j;Rt+j ￿ 1;Gt+j 1g given for j ￿ 1 .
(25)
As for the …scal authority, the set of …rst order conditions de…ne the behavior of
the monetary policy maker and thus, its monetary reaction function (MRF henceforth).
Then, the following de…nition is justi…ed:
De…nition. The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and …s-
cal policy consists of the following time-invariant policy functions CrfZt;￿tg, CofZt;￿tg,
NrfZt;￿tg, NofZt;￿tg, ￿fZt;￿tg, RfZt;￿tg, GfZt;￿tg solving equations (5), (6), (8), (20),
(21), (22), the FRF and the MRF.
Fiscal Leadership game. As for the Nash game, policy makers cannot commit
and decide about policies period by period. Unlike the Nash game however, the …scal
policy is determined before the monetary policy. Therefore, in this context, the …scal au-
thority behaves as the Stackelberg leader, while the monetary authority is the Stackelberg
follower.
The Stackelberg structure becomes relevant only when the utility functions of the mon-
etary or the …scal authority are di¤erent4. Thus, we assume that the monetary authority
is more in‡ation adverse than society, as in Adam and Billi (2008). For this reason, the
objective function of the monetary policy maker is a weighted sum of agents’ utility and
a cost of in‡ation. The monetary authority now solves the following:
4We …nd that both the moneatary leadership and the …scal leadership in this case collapse to the Nash
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t+j;￿t+j;Rt+j ￿ 1;Gt+j 1g given for j ￿ 1 .
(26)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is a measure of monetary conservatism. Notice that, 0 < ￿ < 1 means
that the monetary authority dislikes in‡ation more than society and the Central Bank is
de…ned as partially conservative. Instead, when ￿ = 1 the policy maker only cares about
in‡ation and is de…ned as fully conservative. We may think that a conservative monetary
authority is closer to the ECB’s mandate of maintaining price stability. Given that the
…scal authority is the Stackelberg leader, …scal policy is determined before monetary pol-
icy and it takes into account the conservative monetary policy reaction function, which






























t+j;￿t+j;Rt+j ￿ 1;Gt+jg given for j ￿ 1 .
(27)
4.1 Policy regimes and the optimal steady state
Ramsey steady state. From the …rst order conditions we derive that the value of ￿t
in steady state is 1, which implies price stability. Then, from the Euler equation we …nd










￿   1
￿
(28)
which implies that the steady state real wage does not depend on the fraction of rule of
thumb consumers. Equation (28) resembles the equilibrium result under ‡exible prices,
where steady state real marginal costs equal the inverse of the desired markup.
Given the complexity of the model, the steady state values of the other variables are
obtained through numerical methods, after calibrating parameters. From now on, we will
refer to the calibration shown in Table 1 which is in line with Adam and Billi (2008).
Table 2 resumes the steady state values under Ramsey. Notice that our model nests the
RAE model for ￿ = 0, which is used as a benchmark model. As shown in Table 2, while the
steady state in‡ation rate is always equal to 1, no matter the value of ￿; public spending
reduces with ￿ increasing, even if only marginally. Moreover, notice that consumption of
11Ricardian households, Co; is an increasing function of ￿: The reason is the following. As
￿ increases, the fraction of Ricardians decreases so that per capita pro…ts D=(1 ￿) rise,
boosting per capita Ricardian consumption. Liquidity constrained consumption slightly
increases as ￿ becomes greater than 0.3 due to a small reduction of G. In fact, the steady
state of the Government budget constraint implies G = T = T o = T r, and therefore from
(6) we obtain Cr = wNr   G. It is easy to understand that the more than proportional
decrease in G with respect to Nr causes Cr to rise, since the steady state value of the
real wage is constant. Therefore, from the policy authority point of view, it is optimal to
reduce public spending to maximize welfare when ￿ increases, because it rises Cr.
However, overall the e¤ects of varying ￿ are only marginal under Ramsey.
Nash steady state. We …nd the steady state of the Nash game through numerical
methods. In Table 3 these values are collected.
As pointed out by Adam and Billi (2008), when the policy authorities play simultane-
ously and under discretion there is an in‡ation bias with respect to the Ramsey steady
state. In our model, the in‡ation bias increases dramatically as the fraction of liquidity
constrained households ￿ gets higher. The Central Bank annualized in‡ation target ap-
proaches 9% even for a small fraction of non-Ricardian agents close to 30%. The intuition
is straightforward. The in‡ation bias arises because the monetary authority disregards
private expectations on in‡ation. Further, limited asset market participation is an ad-
ditional distortion in the economy with respect to the two usually faced by the Central
Bank, i.e.: i) the monopolistic competition distortion; ii) the sticky price distortion. The
…rst one reduces as the steady state in‡ation increases. This happens because the steady
state in‡ation rate acts as an implicit tax on pro…ts. On the contrary, the sticky price dis-
tortion calls for price stability by reducing the price adjustment costs. When ￿ increases,
per capita pro…ts earned by Ricardians, .i.e. D=(1   ￿); get higher and the monopolistic
distortion increases. By increasing the steady state in‡ation rate the Central Bank reduces
the monopolistic distortion and increases the steady state output. Overall, the monop-
olistic distortion seems to prevail and becomes more and more relevant as the fraction
of liquidity constrained consumers increases. Therefore, the optimal steady state in‡a-
tion remains highly positive for empirically plausible values of the Rotemberg adjustment
costs5 and increases as ￿ gets higher.6
5We consider also a value of ￿ alternative to the baseline value consider by Adam and Billi (2008).
We translate the cost of adjusting prices into an equivalent Calvo probability, i.e. ￿ = " 1
￿ ; where
￿ =
(1  )(1  ￿)
  and   = 0:75 is the Calvo probability that …rms do not adjust prices. This allows to
generate a slope of the Phillips curve consistent with empirical and theoretical studies. We get a value
of ￿ = 58; which is more than three times higher than the one considered by Adam and Billi (2008).
The results about the in‡ation bias remains relevant although the optimal steady state in‡ation slightly
lowers.
6Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) study optimal Ramsey monetary and …scal policy in a NK model
with sticky price à la Rotemberg (1982) and …nd that the optimal in‡ation rate turns positive only in
a model where the monopolistic distortion, i.e. …rms markup, is very high and empirical unplausible.
12Finally, we also …nd a government spending bias, as in the RAE. However, this bias
is only marginally a¤ected by liquidity constrained consumers. This happens because the
…scal authority takes into account that an increase in public spending has two e¤ects.
First, government spending enters directly households’ utility function. Therefore, an
increase in spending increases welfare. Second, an increase in G, by implying higher
taxes, reduces liquidity constrained disposable income and thus their consumption and
welfare.
Fiscal Leader steady state. Table 4 shows that the optimal steady state values
under the Fiscal Leadership with a partially conservative monetary policy (￿ = 0:5)
change only marginally with respect to the Nash case.
As expected, when ￿ = 1, meaning that the monetary authority only cares about
in‡ation, the Fiscal Leadership leads to the Ramsey steady state (see Table 5). The …scal
authority takes into account that the monetary policy maker is determined to achieve
price stability at all costs, so that if there is a …scal expansion it will rise the interest rate
to contain in‡ationary pressures. The …scal policy maker bene…ts of the …rst move and
therefore can internalize this e¤ect, leading to the Ramsey steady state. This also implies
that the welfare losses are minimized, as we will show in the next section.
We state the main …nding of this section in Result 1.
Result 1. Under the Nash game and the Fiscal Leadership game with partially conser-
vative Central Bank, the optimal monetary policy implies an in‡ation bias which
strongly increases as the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers, ￿; increases.
4.2 Policy regimes and the optimal dynamics
Ramsey dynamics. We analyze the model dynamics in the case of Ramsey op-
timum through impulse response functions (IRFs henceforth). We look at the optimal
dynamics in response to a positive technology and to a negative markup shock.
- Figure 3 and 4 about here -
Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of a 1% increase in technology on the main macroeconomic
variables. We consider the fully Ricardian case (￿ = 0, dashed lines) and the case in which
the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers is ￿ = 0:5 (solid lines). As expected, in
both cases policy makers accommodate the shock to boost the economy by reducing
Instead, we …nd that the absense of commitment and the presence of LAMP is su¢cient to ensure positive
steady state in‡ation level even with moderate values of …rms markup.
13nominal interest rates and raising public expenditure. The authorities commit so that
they are completely credible; this is why the resulting optimal dynamics feature price
stability and a persistent increase of aggregate output, no matter the value of ￿.
In response to a negative price markup shock we get di¤erent results. Figure 4 shows
the e¤ects of a 1% increase in the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
(which implies a reduction in …rms markup) to the main macroeconomic variables. The
optimal IRFs to a markup shock imply deviation from price stability, a positive public
spending and an increase in output. Deviation from price stability seems moderately
a¤ected by LAMP. However, di¤erently from the RAE model, it is achieved through a
small reduction of the nominal interest rate, which leaves the real rate almost unchanged.
Interestingly, public spending instead increases as the fraction of liquidity constrained
agents gets higher. Furthermore, the response on impact of public spending is signi…cantly
higher (in absolute value) and the e¤ect of the shock is reabsorbed after more periods
than in the benchmark model. Summing up, an increasing boost to public expenditure
and a greater reduction in interest rates are needed to sustain welfare as ￿ increases.
The e¤ects of ￿ on in‡ation and government spending dynamics are emphasized in
Figures 5 and 6, which show the optimal in‡ation volatility and the optimal government
spending volatility for ￿ 2 (0;0:7) in face of technology and markup shocks. We …nd that,
optimal in‡ation volatility increases with ￿; while optimal government spending volatility
is only moderately a¤ected by the fraction of liquidity constraint consumers.
- Figure 5 and 6 about here -
Nash dynamics. Under Nash some di¤erences emerge with respect to Ramsey
dynamics. Figure 7 depicts the optimal deviations from the steady state of the main
macroeconomic variables in response to a persistent technology shock and markup shock,
for ￿ = 0 (dashed lines) and ￿ = 0:5 (solid lines).
- Figure 7 and 8 about here -
In response to a technology shock, the lack of commitment produces a rise in in‡ation
and an increase in output. Remarkably, hours worked fall. The contraction in hours
following a positive productivity shock is in line with recent US evidence (see, for example,
Galì and Rabanal, 2004). The in‡ation bias increases as ￿ increases, while the reduction
in labor hours gets higher. The intuition for these results is the following. The monetary
policy is not forward looking, it decides period by period and thus generates an in‡ation
bias: the authority is tempted to stimulate demand by lowering interest rates, which
increases Ricardian consumption. The aggregate demand is then stimulated by an increase
in public spending, which together with the accommodative monetary policy contributes
14to push output and in‡ation up. Per capita pro…ts increase giving an additional boost to
Ricardian consumption. This in turn reduces their labor supply. The increase in in‡ation
more than double when passing from ￿ = 0 to ￿ = 0:5: This happens because the monetary
authority is aimed at reducing the higher distortion coming from the increase of per capita
pro…ts, which otherwise would lower aggregate output. Instead, public spending is not
a¤ected by ￿:
The IRFs relative to the markup shock are represented in Figure 8. The …scal policy
responds by reducing Gt on impact while monetary policy maker decreases the interest
rate. The presence of liquidity constrained consumers (￿ = 0:5) involve a greater reaction
of policy decision variables and consequently a greater impact on private sector variables.
Liquidity constrained consumption rises due to the huge reduction of public spending
and the expansive monetary policy pushes Co
t up. This puts pressure on the reduction
of hours worked and consequently of output. In particular, as ￿ increases the stronger
reactions of policy makers cause consumption of both types of consumers to rise more
and consequently labor supply to decrease. When ￿ = 0 the impact e¤ect on hours and
output is positive: the greater increase of real wages and the lower rise of consumption
cause labor supply to augment
Figures 9 and 10 show the optimal in‡ation volatility and the optimal government
spending volatility for ￿ 2 (0;0:7) in face of technology and markup shocks. We …nd
that, while optimal in‡ation volatility increases with ￿; optimal government spending
volatility decreases as the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers increases.
- Figure 9 and 10 about here -
Fiscal Leader dynamics. With ￿ = 0:5; i.e. with a partially conservative mon-
etary policy, we observe that the optimal dynamics under the Fiscal leadership change
only marginally with respect to the Nash case.7 Figures 11 and 12 show the IRFs to a
technology and to a markup shock.
- Figure 11 and 12 about here -
When ￿ = 1 Figures 13 and 14 show that a positive technology shock and a negative
markup shock lead to price stability, no matter the value of ￿. However, under a markup
shock it is interesting to note that in the presence of liquidity constrained consumers,
price stability is achieved with a di¤erent response of the monetary policy instrument
7Analogously, optimal in‡ation volatility and optimal government spending volatility under a Fiscal
leadership with partially conservative monetary policy show very similar …gures to the ones with get
under Nash.
15with respect to the RAE model. The monetary authority slightly raises the interest rate,
while the RAE model points to a signi…cant reduction. Moreover, optimal …scal policy
becomes more expansionary in a model with higher LAMP.
- Figure 13 and 14 about here -
Figures 15 and 16 show the optimal in‡ation volatility and the optimal government
spending volatility for ￿ 2 (0;0:7) in face of technology and markup shocks in the case
of fully conservative monetary authority (￿ = 1). Optimal in‡ation volatility does not
depend on the fraction of liquidity constrained households. Interestingly, optimal govern-
ment spending volatility increases with ￿.
- Figure 15 and 16 about here -
We state the main …nding of this section in Result 2:
Result 2. Under the Nash game and the Fiscal Leadership game with partially conserv-
ative Central Bank, in response to both technology and markup shocks, the in‡ation
bias gets dramatically higher as ￿ increases. In response to a negative markup shock,
a larger decrease of public consumption is needed as ￿ increases.
5 Welfare analysis
In this section we show a measure for the utility losses associated to a particular game
structure. We calculate the percent loss of each game structure with respect to the Ramsey
deterministic steady state. Denote V DSS = [￿u(Cr;Nr;G)+(1 ￿)u(Co;No;G)]=(1 ￿)
the period utility for the Ramsey deterministic steady state and V A the stochastic steady
state of the value function of an alternative policy regime. The permanent reduction
in private consumption, ￿A ￿ 0 (supposing to withdraw the same amount from each
type of consumer), that would imply the Ramsey deterministic steady state to be welfare

















We use the same formulas to evaluate welfare for each type of consumer, i.e., V DSS
h =














where h 2 (r;o) identi…es the two types of consumers.
Table 6 shows the welfare losses in percentage terms resulting from the RAE model and
the model with liquidity constrained consumers for each policy regime and distinguishing
between total, Ricardian and liquidity constrained welfare. What we note is that the
Nash equilibrium leads to a total welfare loss which is bigger than the Fiscal Leadership
case where the monetary policy is partially conservative about in‡ation. As in Adam and
Billi (2008), the Fiscal Leader structure with ￿ = 1 minimizes the deviation from Ramsey
allocations.
Notably, Table 6 shows that the Nash game and the Fiscal Leadership with partially
conservative monetary policy involve a great loss of welfare for Ricardians while liquidity
constrained consumers experience a gain. This is due to the fact that under these types
of policy regimes the equilibrium implies an in‡ation bias which makes per capita pro…ts
lower. On the contrary, the higher production with respect to the Ramsey allocation
implies a higher real wage which has a direct positive e¤ect on liquidity constrained
agents consumption, thus raising their welfare.
When monetary policy is partially conservative, this result still holds, even if the loss
in terms of welfare of Ricardians is slightly lower, due to the fact that the in‡ation bias
is marginally dampened by conservatism of monetary policy.
Summing up, we can state the following:
Result 3. Under the Nash game and the Fiscal Leadership game with partially conserv-
ative Central Bank, liquidity constrained consumers experience a welfare gain with
respect to Ramsey, while Ricardians a welfare loss.
6 Conclusions
In this study we investigate the e¤ects of the presence of a fraction of consumers who
cannot smooth consumption and have no access to state-contingent markets nor receive
dividends, on policy responses both in the long-run and in the short run. We compare
our results to the fully Ricardian model. We concentrate on di¤erent structures for policy
decision making. After considering the Ramsey problem, we consider two types of dis-
cretionary policy regimes: i) the Nash game, where the monetary and …scal policies are
independent and play simultaneously; ii) the Fiscal Leadership game, where the …scal au-
thority is the Stackelberg leader, deciding before the monetary policy, and the monetary
authority is conservative about in‡ation. The …scal policy chooses the amount of public
17expenditure while the monetary authority decides on the level of the nominal interest
rate.
Concerning the long-run equilibrium, we …nd that under the Nash game and the Fiscal
Leadership game with partially conservative Central Bank, the optimal monetary policy
implies an in‡ation bias which strongly increases as the fraction of liquidity constrained
consumers increases. This happens because the monetary policy aims at reducing the
monopolistic distortion, which increases as ￿ gets higher.
Analyzing the optimal responses in face of a positive technology and a negative price
markup shocks, we …nd that LAMP plays an important role also under Ramsey. The
optimal responses to a markup shock imply deviation from price stability and a positive
public spending. Moreover, as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents gets higher
public spending increases. The presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters quanti-
tatively also the reaction of discretionary policies. In this case in response to both shocks,
the in‡ation bias gets higher as ￿ increases. On the contrary, while public spending re-
mains unchanged in face of a technology shock, in response to a negative markup shock,
a larger decrease of public consumption is needed.
Finally, we …nd that contrary to what happens to Ricardian consumers, under discre-
tionary policy regimes liquidity constrained agents get a welfare gain.
We think this paper could give interesting insights on how economic policy should be
run when the presence of LAMP is taken into account. LAMP typically increases after a
…nancial crisis. There is evidence that the condition of access to credit have worsened after
the 2007-2010 crisis. In response to a markup shock, the presence of liquidity constrained
consumers makes the role of …scal policy become more relevant. Thus, policy makers
should probably rely more on …scal policy in periods of recession, in particular if the
downturn originated from a …nancial crisis, which is often associated with a shortage of
liquidity and a worsening of the conditions of access to credit, which correspond to a
higher fraction of liquidity constrained consumers in our model.
Further developments of this study include the possibility of considering di¤erent …scal
structures, given that the balanced budget requirement is a very simplifying assumption
and it is not always such a proper description of a country’s …scal structure. It would
also be interesting to have a game structure where there are several …scal authorities
playing with a unique monetary authority, which is a case very close to the EU context.
Allowing for a shock to the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers is also an issue
under analysis for future research.
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7.1 The Ramsey Problem
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7.2 Ramsey steady state
We impose the steady state and get
￿
2 = 0 (38)
￿
3 = !gG
 ￿ + ￿
5 (39)
from (36) and (37). Then combining (38) with (35) we obtain
￿ = 1 (40)















￿   1
￿
(42)
The steady state values of the other variables are obtained through numerical methods.
217.3 Nash policy game
7.3.1 Fiscal policy problem
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7.3.2 Monetary policy problem

























 ￿(￿t   1)￿t  

























































t + (1   ￿)N
o
t ]   ￿C
r
t   (1   ￿)C
o
t   Gt  
￿
2





















































































































'(' + 1) = 0
(50)
(1   ￿)C
o
t





































￿ 1 = 0
(51)















































 ￿(2￿t   1)   ￿
3










In steady state (38) and (39) still hold, but there is no more price stability (￿ > 1). In
this case all other steady state values are obtained through numerical methods.
7.4 Conservative monetary policy problem
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Solving for the steady state we …nd analogously:
￿
13 = 0 (61)
257.5 Fiscal leadership with conservative monetary policy
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Fig. 1. Credit standards in the Euro Area economy.












































Fig. 2. Credit standards in the US economy.



























Fig. 3. Ramsey IRFs to a 1% positive technology shock under the baseline model (solid
lines) and the RAE model (dashed lines).




























Fig. 4. Ramsey IRFs to a 1% negative markup shock under the baseline model (solid
lines) and the RAE model (dashed lines).































Fig. 5. LAMP and optimal in‡ation volatility under Ramsey.

































Fig. 6. LAMP and optimal government spending volatility under Ramsey.


































per capita real profits
Fig. 7. Nash IRFs in response to a 1% positive technology shock under the baseline
model (solid lines) and the RAE model (dashed lines).
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Fig. 8. Nash IRFs to a 1% negative markup shock under the baseline model (solid lines)
and the RAE model (dashed lines).
































Fig. 9. LAMP and optimal in‡ation volatility under Nash.





























Fig. 10. LAMP and optimal government spending volatility under Nash.



























Fig. 11. IRFs to a 1% positive technology shock with Fiscal Leadership and partially
conservative monetary policy under the baseline model (solid lines) and the RAE model
(dashed lines).


























Fig. 12. IRFs to a 1% negative markup shock with Fiscal Leadership and partially
conservative monetary policy under the baseline model (solid lines) and the RAE model
(dashed lines).



























Fig. 13. IRFs to a 1% positive technology shock with Fiscal Leadership and fully
conservative monetary policy under the baseline model (solid lines) and the RAE model
(dashed lines).





























Fig. 14. IRFs to a 1% negative markup shock with Fiscal Leadership and fully
conservative monetary policy under the baseline model (solid lines) and the RAE model
(dashed lines).


































Fig. 15. LAMP and optimal in‡ation volatility under Fiscal Leadership with fully
conservative monetary policy.








Optimal volatility of public spending
Fig. 16. LAMP and Optimal government spending volatility under Fiscal Leadership
with fully conservative monetary policy
37parameters value source
￿ 0.9913 Adam and Billi (2008)
￿ 17.5 Adam and Billi (2008) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
￿ 1 in line with Adam and Billi (2008) log utility function
' 1 Adam and Billi (2008)
!n 26.042 Adam and Billi (2008)
!g 0.227 Adam and Billi (2008)
￿ 6 Adam and Billi (2008) and Galì et al. (2004)
Z 1 Adam and Billi (2008)
￿ (SS) varying






RAE,￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:5
￿ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
R 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087
G 0.0400 0.0398 0.0395
Y 0.2001 0.2003 0.2007
Cr 0.1446 0.1448
Co 0.1600 0.1673 0.1776
Nr 0.2213 0.2211
No 0.2000 0.1913 0.1802
Do 0.0333 0.0477 0.0669
Table 2: Stochastic steady state values under Ramsey
38RAE,￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:5
￿ 1.0146 1.0222 1.0341
R 1.0234 1.0311 1.0431
G 0.0402 0.0402 0.0403
Y 0.2014 0.2032 0.2068
Cr 0.1450 0.1453
Co 0.1593 0.1645 0.1675
Nr 0.2215 0.2215
No 0.2014 0.1952 0.1921
Do 0.0313 0.0414 0.0468
Table 3: Stochastic steady state values under Nash
RAE,￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:5
￿ 1.0144 1.0220 1.0338
R 1.0233 1.0309 1.0428
G 0.0402 0.0402 0.0403
Y 0.2014 0.2031 0.2067
Cr 0.1450 0.1453
Co 0.1593 0.1645 0.1676
Nr 0.2215 0.2215
No 0.2013 0.1952 0.1919
Do 0.0314 0.0415 0.0471
Table 4: Stochastic steady state values under Fiscal Leadership and partially conservative
monetary policy (￿ = 0:5)
39RAE,￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:5
￿ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
R 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087
G 0.0400 0.0398 0.0395
Y 0.2001 0.2003 0.2007
Cr 0.1446 0.1448
Co 0.1600 0.1673 0.1776
Nr 0.2213 0.2211
No 0.2000 0.1913 0.1802
Do 0.0334 0.0477 0.0669
Table 5: Stochastic steady state values under Fiscal Leadership and fully conservative
monetary policy (￿ = 1)
RAE, ￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:5
total total Ricardians LC total Ricardians LC
Nash -1.03 -2.30 -3.42 0.38 -5.18 -10.60 0.57
Fiscal Leader with ￿ = 0:5 -1.01 -2.26 -3.36 0.38 -5.10 -10.44 0.56
Table 6: Welfare losses from Ramsey allocations in consumption equivalents (percentages)
40